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ABSTRACT
Personality disorder (PD) has long been criticized as a diagnosis, not least for the issue of its supposed untreat-
ability. This has precluded many offenders with PD from receiving treatment for their disorder in a secure 
hospital, with detention in the potentially deleterious penal environment the result. However, transfers for 
public protection continue to occur. A further problematic issue for treatment considerations when diversion 
from prison hangs in the balance is the removal of the need for proposed treatment to provide a therapeutic 
benefi t under the recently amended Mental Health Act 1983. In light of these developments, this paper consid-
ers the signifi cance of human rights instruments, such as the European Prison Rules 2006, which aim to offer 
rights to treatment, giving the offender with a diagnosis of PD access to adequate and sustaining treatment, 
both in prison and secure hospitals. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction: Treatment and international 
human rights instruments
Personality disorder: Therapeutic ambivalence 
precursory to inadequate medical care
After half a century of legal developments, 
‘rights’ to treatment in prisons have been given a 
fresh outlook in the form of the European Prison 
Rules (EPR; Council of Europe, Recommendation 
Rec, 2006), Article 10(3) of which states: ‘The 
penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of 
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be 
their reformation and social rehabililtation . . . ’ . 
In 1990, the Home Offi ce (1990), previously 
opposed to the idea, gave a voice to this ideal 
by contracting in the National Health Service 
into prisons. Furthermore, with the aim of giving 
prisoners access to the equivalent quality and 
range of services received by the public, in April 
2003, budgets for funding prison health services 
shifted from the Home Offi ce to the Department 
of Health. And from April 2006, prison health, 
including mental health, care was transferred 
to the NHS (Department for Health, 2003). One 
ought to question whether these positive moves 
have resulted in improved access to medical care. 
With continuing gaps in service provision and 
overcrowding1, it is clear that an observation of 
the Department of Health and Social Security & 
the Home Offi ce in 1987 remains pertinent: ‘The 
degree of overcrowding and pressure of facilities 
1As of February 2008, the total prison population had 
reached 82 283–311 over ‘operational capacity’ (HM Prison 
Service, 2008).
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in the local prisons . . . is at a level which mili-
tates against the promotion of health-care, both 
physical and mental’2.
The implications of this shortfall must not be 
underestimated. Whilst studies often proffer little 
differentiation between mental disorders when 
examining suicide, Dooley (1990) revealed that 
the diagnosis of personality disorder (PD) was 
implicated in 26% of cases. Recently, Jenkins et al. 
(2005) found 57% of those who had made suicide 
attempts had antisocial or other PD. Already sig-
nifi cant, with ongoing problems in screening for 
the disorder, the true percentage is likely to be 
higher. Liebling (2006) takes a different approach, 
proposing that ‘relational or moral aspects’ of pris-
oners’ treatment are linked to levels of distress, 
which in turn increases institutional suicide rates3. 
But, if despair is a product of mental disorders4, 
and mental disorders lead to an increased risk of 
suicide5, it must be questioned whether the conse-
quences of inadequate treatment have been over-
looked in the prevention of prison suicide.
The absence of a right to proper rehabilitation 
was fi rst realized in 1990, in the case of Knight v 
Home Offi ce, in which the violent disposition of a 
mentally disordered offender prevented his receiv-
ing treatment in a hospital ward. Instead, he 
received treatment in prison, where he subse-
quently committed suicide following inadequate 
supervision. Asked to fi nd a ruling of negligence, 
however, the court declined:
‘The prison’s central function is to detain persons 
deprived of their liberty by operation of law. The 
prison authorities have a duty to provide medical care 
where physical or mental illness is present. But the 
law should not and does not expect the same stan-
dard across the entire spectrum of possible situations, 
including the possibility of suicide, as it would in a 
psychiatric hospital outside prison.’6
Only a decade on, as a reaction to concerns 
expressed by the then HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 
Sir David Ramsbotham (1996), on poor treat-
ment standards in prison, The National Service 
Framework for Mental Health recognized that 
prisoners should expect the same quality of care 
as others7. This sentiment appears in Rule 47.2 of 
the EPR 2006, which provides that: ‘The prison 
medical service shall provide for the psychiatric 
treatment of all prisoners who are in need of such 
treatment and pay particular attention to suicide 
prevention’. Yet, incompatibly, the commentary to 
Rule 47 says that: ‘Appropriate therapeutic options 
should be available for persons with mental disor-
ders detained in penal institutions.’ Besides the 
lack of clarifi cation as to the meaning of ‘appro-
priate’8, when read in light of Rule 47.2 above, 
‘shall provide’ runs counter to ‘appropriate thera-
peutic options’ in respect of prisoners’ ‘rights’. 
Taken together, they could sanction the provision 
of only that treatment which an authority con-
siders appropriate. If this is a correct reading of 
the EPR 2006, the provisions are self-defeating. 
The practical result would be remarkably similar 
to principle 20(2) of the UN Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and 
the Improvement of Mental Health Care, which, 
extending its rights to treatment to criminal 
offenders, states that this need only be ‘to the 
fullest extent possible’9.
2DHSS/HO (1987, paragraph 5.1).
3In addition, in 2003, there were 17 294 cases of attempted 
suicide and cases of self-harm (Lead Article, 2006).
4In accordance with Section 1(2) of the MHA 1983 (as 
amended), the term ‘mental disorder’ now encompasses PD.
5Shaw, Baker, Hunt, Moloney, and Appleby (2004) identifi ed 
that 72%of those who committed suicide had a mental 
disorder.
6(1990) 3 All ER 237, per Pill, J, paragraph 38.
7DOH (1999, p. 9).
8In terms of physical health, Rule 41.1 suggests this involves 
access to ‘at least one qualifi ed general practitioner’; and 
in accordance with Rule 41.3, if deemed ‘appropriate’, on a 
part-time basis.
9This conclusion would provide for interesting re-reading of 
the quote provided by the then Home Secretary, John Read, 
when asked whether he thought prisons worked, to which he 
replied: they allow ‘the full possibility of rehabilitation’ (Reid, 
2006).
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In reality, to ‘the fullest extent possible’ may in 
fact be substituted for ‘the extent deemed worthy’. 
For one Institute of Psychiatry discussion paper 
(Moran, 1999) suggests that psychiatrists generally 
dislike the diagnosis of PD10. According to Lewis 
and Appleby (1988), the prevailing view is that 
sufferers are less deserving of treatment than those 
with other disorders of mind. As evidence of this, 
Bateman and Tyrer (2004) more recently provide 
that assertive outreach teams, and within the 
forensic system, regional medium secure units 
often exclude patients with PD. Others reveal that 
many doctors are concerned that they have neither 
‘the skills, training, nor resources to provide ade-
quate services’ (NIMHE, 2003). These hurdles are 
surely not envisaged by Rule 40.3, which states: 
‘Prisoners shall have access to the health services 
available in the country without discrimination on 
the grounds of their legal situation’. In sum, Rules 
40.3 and 47.2 are substantively clear on the level 
of care to be expected, but are clouded by practical 
factors such as resource provision and the unwill-
ingness of some professionals to engage with the 
disorder.
Recourse to convention rights for prisoners 
seeking treatment?
The Human Rights Act 1998 became a binding 
legal instrument in 2000; it seeks to protect certain 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The principle arti-
cles aiming to guard against the infringement of 
treatment rights are Article 3 (the prohibition 
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment) and Article 2 (the right to life 
protected by law).
Article 3
Inadequate psychiatric care could potentially 
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Article 3, however, poses an onerous duty on a 
potential applicant hoping to prove a breach, for 
one must demonstrate, in the words of Kudla v 
Poland (a case concerning a prisoner with a PD), 
that:
‘the manner and method of the execution of the 
measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of 
an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of 
suffering inherent in detention and that, given the 
practical demands of imprisonment, his health and 
well-being are adequately secured by, among other 
things, providing him with the requisite medical 
assistance’11.
Theoretically, imprisonment should entail only a 
deprivation of liberty. WHO embodies this stan-
dard stating that imprisonment should not result 
in the depriving of other human rights, including 
‘exposure to greater risks to their health than they 
would face in the community’12. This was exempli-
fi ed in Keenan v United Kingdom, in which Article 
3 was engaged after an at-risk mentally ill prisoner 
who subsequently committed suicide after being 
placed in a segregation block for punishment. It 
was found that an absence of appropriate super-
vision and psychiatric input into his treatment 
culminated in the inability of the prisoner to 
withstand the stress of prison life13.
The case of Keenan compliments the duty to 
prevent prisoner suicide through reasonable care 
in the House of Lords case of Reeves v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis14. It contrasts with the 
earlier dicta of R v North Humberside and Scunthorpe 
Coroner, ex p Jamieson15, in which the verdict of 
10In light of the qualifi cation ‘generally’, one ought to note 
the drive in some quarters to increase knowledge regarding 
the effi cacy of treatments offered in secure units. Notably, 
Duggan et al. (2006) recently conducted a review of all ran-
domized controlled trials of psychological interventions for 
participants with a recognized PD.
11(2002) 35 EHRR 11, paragraph 94.
12WHO (2002, p. 13).
13(1998) 26 EHRR CD64, paragraphs 113–115.
14(1999) QB 169, at 379.
15(1994) 3 All ER 972.
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lack of care was available only in cases where there 
had been ‘gross neglect’ directly connected with 
the suicide. This is to be welcomed: if ‘gross neglect’ 
were the standard to engage Article 3 where the 
possibility of inadequate treatment is raised in 
respect of prison suicide, given that one ought to 
expect an ‘unavoidable level of suffering inherent 
in detention’ following Kudla, proving that suicide 
resulted from inadequate treatment would be 
an impossible burden, providing some ‘medical 
assistance’ was received by the prisoner. Yet, this 
result is conceivable even disregarding Reeves v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. For, if the 
‘manner’ of imprisonment described in Kudla is 
taken to mean overcrowded conditions, proving 
that ‘health and well-being’ were not adequately 
secured and that this resulted in ‘unavoidable’ suf-
fering, will be more burdensome given the court’s 
willingness to take into consideration the ‘practi-
cal demands of prison’. Evidently, in legal terms, 
the fact of overcrowded conditions in the penal 
system would suggest that it is currently permi-
ssible to provide substandard treatment within 
them.
Article 2
The right to life is enshrined in Article 2 of the 
ECHR16. In Keenan, the court held that the 
authorities had a positive duty to prevent 
self-infl icted deaths when the authorities were 
on notice of a ‘real and immediate risk’ to life, 
therefore extending the dicta of Osman v 
United Kingdom to outside third-party danger17. 
Specifi cally, at paragraphs 89–92, the positive duty 
under Article 2 was extended to ‘where the risk to 
a person derives from self-harm’. However, it was 
said that there being no way of knowing that 
the deceased posed an immediate risk to himself, 
coupled with the existence of daily medical 
supervision and a lack of evidence otherwise 
indicating failure to provide care which would 
have averted his suicide, meant that the authorities 
had done all that was required of them18. The case 
of Keenan would appear to put out of reach Article 
2 rights if it could not be proven that the authorities 
were aware of the risk of the prisoner self-harming19. 
Moreover, achieving this high threshold continues 
to be compromised by the fact that obligatory 
screening for mental health conditions is not a 
legal requirement during imprisonment.
Diversion of Article 5 convention rights
Hospital orders and falling foul of criminal 
responsibility
The issue of treatment rights for the offender with 
PD is felt most forcefully in respect of diversionary 
practices. For the mentally disordered offender, 
diversion embodies the principle of treatment over 
punishment (Department of Health and Home 
Offi ce, 1992). Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 
1983 states that one option open to the court on 
sentencing is a ‘hospital order’. In R v Birch, it was 
said that this entails removing the offender from 
the penal process and placing the patient ‘in the 
hands of the doctors’, in so doing, dispensing with 
retributive and deterrent aims of imprisonment20.
Whilst fortifying therapeutic rather than puni-
tive ideals, the appropriateness of any deprivation 
of liberty, by way of hospital order or otherwise, is 
policed by Article 5(1) of the ECHR. Under sub-
section (e), it is lawful to deprive an individual of 
‘unsound mind’ of their liberty, and remains so in 
the presence of a continued mental disorder, as 
16See McFeeley v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 161.
17(2000) 29 EHRR 245.
18At parapraphs 93–101.
19Its scope is further limited by allowing only the deceased’s 
next-of-kin to present an Article 2 case.
20(1989) 11 Cr App R(S) 202 (CA), Mustill LJ, at 210. An 
exception exists where it is necessary to mark the gravity of 
the offence with punishment (R v Morris (1961) 45 Cr App 
R 185; R v Birch, at 215, per Mustill LJ), or there is no reason-
able prospect of treatment (R v Birch, at 215, per Mustill 
LJ).
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shown by objective medical evidence21. Article 
5(1)(e) was applied, successfully, in Aerts v Belgium 
(a case involving a diagnosis of borderline PD), in 
which it was adjudged unlawful to have held 
on remand a mentally disordered offender for 7 
months while a hospital bed was sought in accor-
dance with the directions of the court22.
Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s ‘Recom-
mendation Rec (2004)’ 10 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states concerning the protec-
tion of the human rights and dignity of persons 
with mental disorder’ suggests that the mentally 
disordered offender be cared for in ‘the least restric-
tive environment available’. The result is that 
Aerts appears to have gone one step farther than 
Article 8. The decision runs closer to Article 4 of 
the EPR 2006, which provides that: ‘Prison condi-
tions that infringe prisoners’ human rights are not 
justifi ed by a lack of resources.’ And though Aerts 
was a prisoner on remand, since s.37(4) specifi es 
that a prisoner may be conveyed to and detained 
in a place of safety, defi ned in Section 55(1) to 
include a prison or remand centre, it is relevant by 
analogy23.
Aerts may be contrasted with Bizzotto v Greece24, 
concerning Article 5(1)(a). This Section provides 
for the ‘lawful detention of a person after convic-
tion by a competent court’. In this case, a non-
mentally disordered offender was convicted of 
drug charges, and was handed drug rehabilitation 
rather than a penal sentence. The Greek authori-
ties could not provide Bizzotto with the necessary 
facilities, however, and he was instead remanded 
in prison until such time as those facilities became 
available. Under Greek law, an offender sentenced 
to drug rehabilitation is subject to periodic re-
view following 1 year’s detention to determine the 
appropriateness of continued detention. Despite 
the ruling in Ashingdane v United Kingdom that 
there must be some relationship between the 
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty and 
the place and conditions of detention25, the court 
held that a period of detention was passed for the 
purposes of punishment, and so the decision to 
place Bizzotto in prison did not affect the main 
grounds of his detention26.
The dichotomy of approaches in Bizzotto and 
Aerts encapsulates the problem of criminal respon-
sibility determining treatment conditions. As Mr 
Bizzotto found out to his detriment, the absence 
of criminal responsibility appears to provide a 
turnkey to accessing adequate treatment. Put 
another way, if one is not found to have a mental 
disorder, then the Convention would not seem to 
require that a prisoner receive adequate care. The 
danger here is that PD is identifi ed only sparingly 
in prisons. Factors limiting diagnosis were recently 
identifi ed by Salize, Dreßing, and Kief (2007) in 
their evaluation of the practices of 24 European 
countries. They suggest that at a national level, 
common standards ‘hardly exist’ with regards 
the quality of screenings. Even within countries, 
routine practices often differ from region to region, 
possibly due to the ‘lack of adequately trained staff, 
scarce fi nancial resources or other causes’. ‘Other 
causes’ must certainly take account of the infancy 
of clinical assessments for diagnosing PD. The reli-
ability of assessments is hampered, not merely by 
21This formed part of a three-pronged test in Winterwerp v 
The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387. Starkly, art 14(1) of the 
2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure that persons 
with disabilities, on an equal basis with others . . .’ (b) ‘Are 
not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and 
that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, 
and that the existence of a disability shall in no case justify 
the deprivation of liberty.’ Whether for treatment or other-
wise, the idea that no mentally disordered offender should 
be detained for treatment can surely not have been the inten-
tion of the UN. Arguably, this merely recognizes the ‘Bourne-
wood’ litigation, which exposed the dangers of exercising 
‘complete and effective control’ over a patient, absent legal 
safeguards upon which a patient could challenge the lawful-
ness of their detention. See HL v United Kingdom (2005) 40 
EHRR 32, paragraph 91.
22(2000) 29 EHRR 50, paragraph 54.
23Contra., one could conceivably argue that this case con-
cerns only transfer decisions and not detention per se.
24(1996) ECHR 50.
25(1985) 7 EHRR 528, paragraph 44.
26At paragraph 32.
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a lack of validity amongst the different instru-
ments used, but by formal diagnostic criteria, such 
as the DSM-IV, which covers both personality 
traits and social deviance as markers. Therefore, 
unless one is suffering from PD and an attendant 
Axis I disorder, such as the more easily diagnosable 
depression or schizophrenia, those with undiag-
nosed PD are more likely to be housed in a penal 
environment, deleterious to their health27.
Whilst theoretically correct, Peay (1997) 
reminds us that ‘many, if not most, “disordered” 
offenders do not receive the therapeutic “hospital 
order” disposal, even though their culpability 
may be mitigated . . . ’ . In this regard, satisfi ed those 
would be who argue that treatment for mental 
disorders should, as with physical ailments, be 
treated in prison. Bean (2001), indeed, opines that 
psychiatry is concerned with treating mentally 
ill persons, and prison with ‘infl icting suffering 
according to principles of retribution or deter-
rence’, making prison an inappropriate institution 
for care of those with mental disorders.
It is undeniable that factors such as malnutri-
tion28, gross overcrowding, poor ventilation and 
the shipment of prisoners between prisons are 
associated with an increased risk in transmitting 
infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis and hepa-
titis B. However, in a recent qualitative study 
involving interviews with 111 prisoners from 12 
prisons in the public sector, though occasional 
concern was expressed about waiting lists, initial 
assessment, screening during imprisonment and 
management of long-term conditions, such as dia-
betes, were generally spoken of positively (Condon 
et al., 2007). In contrast, those who lament the 
drive to increase care of those with mental disor-
ders, and particularly PD, ought to note the spe-
cifi c concern expressed by the HM Chief Inspec-
tor in her annual report of 2005–2006 on general 
prison healthcare: ‘Mental health within prisons 
remains one of our major concerns. For that reason, 
the Inspectorate is undertaking a thematic review 
into mental health within prisons . . .’ (HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 2007b). 
That review (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for 
England and Wales, 2007) noted an over-reliance 
on medication and little access to psychological 
therapies, preventing the mitigation of physical side 
effects from psychopharmacology. Finally, in this 
year’s annual report on prison healthcare (HM 
Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 
2008), it was said that mental health services are 
‘inappropriate for the level of need’, and once 
again poor screening was cited. Surely, the equiva-
lence of care argument is counterfactual when 
the disorder in question is not conveyed in clinical 
practice.
(Un)Treatability and the abrogation 
of prisoner rights
Arguments lobbied in favour of hospital treatment 
for those with PD are, in some senses, superfi cial, 
in that those offenders forgoing punitive detention 
are often confi ned for longer periods than their 
original sentences. Historically, this was not 
through the operation of Section 37 of the 1983 
Act, as the disorder faced the requirement, con-
tained within Section 37(2)(a)(i), MHA 1983, that 
treatment would be ‘likely to alleviate or prevent 
a deterioration’ in condition. As has been shown, 
there is a pervading therapeutic ambivalence 
towards PD, often manifesting itself in the belief 
that the disordered offender is either diffi cult to 
treat or unresponsive to treatment. If it was deemed 
that the disorder would be responsive to treat-
ment, this then formed the platform from which 
the receipt of substandard treatment in the 
penal institution could be justifi ed, and rights 
deprived.
Later into the prison sentence, however, Section 
47 sanctioned the transfer of the offender with PD 
to hospital if the same conditions were met. The 
27Co-morbid features of substance misuse has also been 
shown to increase the chances of acceptance into secure 
units (Meltzer et al., 2004).
28See Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) 
SA 441 (C), per Brand J (a lack of dietary vitamins contribut-
ing to contracting opportunistic infections).
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injustice here is that for mental disorders other 
than PD, the need for hospital transfer of seriously 
ill prisoners is generally underestimated, and s.47 
never bites on the facts (Blaauw, Roesch, & 
Kerkhof, 2000)29. Yet, despite issues as to the ame-
nability of the disorder to treatment, Section 47 
was often invoked near to the offender’s earliest 
release date, with the effect that sentences were 
extended30. Whilst amenability to treatment may 
have been removed from sections 37 and 47 as a 
consequence of Section 4(7) of the MHA 2007, 
and replaced by the availability of ‘appropriate 
medical treatment’, without a restricted reading of 
the term ‘appropriate’, there continues to be no 
obstacle to prolonged detention.
Dangerousness and indeterminate detention
Indeterminate detention is foremost a concern 
for public protection. In the wake of high-profi le 
murders, most notably Michael Stone, convicted 
of the brutal murders of Lyn and Megan Russell in 
1996, the subsequent central aim of Government 
of ‘maintaining the highest possible levels of public 
protection’31 saw the creation of the non-medical 
dangerous and severe PD (DSPD). The phrase 
DSPD describes adults with an identifi ed PD 
deemed to be severe in nature and resulting in 
antisocial conduct, often demonstrated by the 
committal of serious offences. In an effort to 
address this issue, several Pilot Programmes have 
been set-up to support the ‘delivery and develop-
ment of new services’ for those who present a ‘high 
risk’ of committing violent offences who can be 
‘managed and treated through the appropriate 
pathways of care’ (Home Offi ce, 2005a).
The Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, the 
United States and Canada all have some form 
of indeterminate sentencing (Home Offi ce/
Department of Health Working Group, 1999). The 
main precursor to the DSPD initiative, however, is 
the Dutch Terbesschikkingstelling (TSB) system. 
Under this system, a judge, in respect of an offender 
convicted of an offence carrying a sentence of at 
least 4 years and adjudged by the courts to have a 
serious mental illness such as PD or a learning 
diffi culty, may pass a TSB order exclusively, or 
more likely, in combination with a period of 
imprisonment. In both cases, the order takes effect 
within 6 months. Subsequent treatment in a TSB 
clinic or secure hospital aims to reduce the chances 
of re-offending.
Under the Dutch system, approximately 1 400 
beds are allocated for TSB orders. In England, the 
total bed estate catering for the DSPD initiative is 
approximately 375 (Home Offi ce, 2005b). In sub-
stantive terms, Section 37(4) sanctions the making 
of a hospital order only if the court is satisfi ed 
that an offender can be admitted within 28 days. 
Through the hospital’s inability to provide a bed, 
the court is then constrained by an apparent lack 
of resources32. If bed space should later become 
available to meet the needs of Section 47 transfer-
ees, the supposed injustice in extending sentence 
in a category of offender who is diffi cult to treat 
would now seem redundant. It must be questioned: 
does such a practice not indicate a loss of propor-
tionality to the gravity of one’s sentence?
For both mentally and non-mentally disordered 
offenders, at a domestic level, The Powers of the 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 engen-
ders the principle of proportionality into sentenc-
ing practices33. Certainly, at the European level 
29This is, furthermore, at odds with Rule 40.4 of the EPR, 
2006 which states: ‘Medical Services in prison shall seek to 
detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from 
which prisoners may suffer’.
30Huws et al. (1997) found that between 1984–1991, 10%of 
prisoners were at least as close as 6 weeks to their earliest 
release date, and 66%of those were suffering from PD.
31DOH (1998, para. 4.24).
32Other constraining factors that have arisen, primarily in 
the context of provision of medium secure psychiatric units, 
are the skills levels of staff within a particular unit; make-up 
of its current patient body (Meltzer et al., 2004); and whether 
successful treatment could be achieved within 2 years 
(Grounds et al., 2004).
33Sections 79(2)(a), 35(1) provide that a sentence must be 
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.
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there is a growing recognition that prison sen-
tences must be both humane and as short as 
possible. Duly noting the principles of legitimacy, 
legality and proportionality that underpin Article 
5 of the ECHR, proportionality is explicitly referred 
to in Article 60.2 of the EPR 2006: ‘The severity 
of any punishment shall be proportionate to the 
offence.’ Incongruously, Article 3 of the 2006 
Rules provides that all deprivations are to be 
‘the minimum necessary and proportionate to the 
legitimate objective for which they are imposed’. 
In this respect, Article 3 would appear contrary to 
Article 60.2 in that it permits sentences dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of a crime in diversion cases. 
After all, on its face, the ‘legitimate objective’ is 
to affect a cure. What is more, in terms of Article 
5(1)(e) of the Convention, the offender remains 
lawfully detainable as a consequence of having 
an ‘unsound mind’.
Interestingly, Part II of the Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for the European 
Union (2003) incorporates ‘The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. 
Article 49(3) of the Charter stipulates that ‘The 
severity of penalties must not be disproportionate 
to the criminal offence’. Since the Constitution 
will have binding legal force, the provision would 
directly affect offences committed at the European 
level. As Ashworth and Van Zyl Smit (2004) point 
out: ‘Article II 49(3) of the EU Charter appears to 
proclaim a broader and therefore more demanding 
standard, which raises questions about how it 
might be interpreted and what impact it may have,’ 
with respect to the link between individual rights 
and avoiding sentences disproportionate to the 
crime. Currently, however, in the face of this 
broader standard, indeterminate sentencing cannot 
be considered in the context of the current human 
rights considerations of prison care for the men-
tally disabled; it is arguably a politico-legal consid-
eration, with medico-legal terms like ‘treatability’ 
enabling purely legal decisions as to detention to 
be hidden behind a veil of medical objective, 
causing the ECHR to be satisfi ed that justice 
has been done. The implication is that political 
motives, inextricably bound to those medical, are 
the backdrop to aims such as that expressed by 
the Ministry of Justice (2007), namely, to ‘divert 
offenders with serious mental healthcare needs.’ 
Diversion for ‘healthcare needs’, it appears, is 
subordinate to the needs of politics.
Noting the consequences of the treatability 
requirement with regards to PD, a recommenda-
tion of The Fallon Report in 1999 (Fallon, Blugrass, 
Edwards, & Daniels, 1999)—set up to investigate 
the alleged administrative and therapeutic failings 
of the PD unit at Ashworth Special Hospital34, was 
the introduction of interim transfers. Currently, 
Section 38(5) of the MHA 1983 sanctions the 
making of an interim hospital order to access the 
treatability of an offender suffering from a ‘mental 
disorder’ under Section 1(2) (as amended by 
Section 1(4) of the 2007 Act). Providing the 
offender is liable for imprisonment on conviction, 
they may be detained in hospital for a period of 12 
weeks, which may be renewed for further periods 
of 28 days, for up to a maximum of 6 months. The 
Fallon Report recommended that this period be 
extended to 12 months. Given that this had already 
been at the disposal of the court pursuant to 
Section 49(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, 
this presumably refl ects the ambition of the authors 
to see greater use made of the Section, rather than 
the establishment of new legal ground35. Either 
way, increasing the use of such powers would 
appear reasonable: foremost, it could potentially 
assuage the injustice of transferring prisoners with 
determinate sentences close to their earliest release 
dates (ERDs): a sentence begun in a secure unit 
and subsequently extended would be more diffi cult 
to justify. What is more, the deleterious environ-
ment of the prison could be avoided. But, the 
Report conceded, the instigation of interim orders 
would lead to an untenable increase in prison 
populations36. It would also be unrealistic against 
34It noted, amongst other things, poor clinical care (at 3.13.0) 
and widespread abuse of drugs (3.15.4).
35It was suggested that this would also test offender engage-
ment with services. See Recommendation 54, at 7.7.2.
36At 7.4.5.
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the backdrop of resource management within 
the NHS. Though fi nancial recovery since 2006 
resulted in an audited defi cit of £547 million 
becoming a surplus of £1.789 billion at the end of 
the 3rd quarter of the 2007/2008 fi nancial year 
(Department of Health, 2008), without signifi cant 
investment, the loss will fall to the care of patients. 
The King’s Fund (2007) is correct to suggest that 
‘NHS trusts must be allowed to use the surpluses 
to deliver new services and models of care that 
benefi t patients’. Clearly, the conclusion of Fallon, 
Blugrass, Edwards, and Daniels (1999), that such a 
system would be ‘fraught with diffi culties’, ought 
not to be ignored.
In light of these diffi culties, it is inevitable that 
substantive changes to the law on diversion under 
the Mental Health Act 2007 have merely high-
lighted a reciprocal relationship between domestic 
and international legislation. It will come as no 
comfort to the offender with PD that this has 
merely been to highlight the gap between the sub-
stantive treatment rights outlined in legislation 
and the actual treatment they receive.
Concluding remarks
It has been shown that advocating the rights of 
offenders with PD is troublesome. Whilst, in sub-
stance, human rights instruments are suffi cient to 
augment offenders’ rights to psychiatric treatment, 
the fl owing of rights is far from guaranteed. At the 
macro-level, many of these diffi culties appear to 
arise due to standards being implemented with 
reference to the institution, rather than the needs 
of the offender. The EPR 2006 illustrate this: 
Article 12.1, for instance, is clear that those with 
mental disorders should be detained in an estab-
lishment ‘specially designed for the purpose’; yet, 
Article 12.2 states that if such prisoners are ‘nev-
ertheless exceptionally held in prison there shall 
be special regulations that take account of their 
status and needs’.
It was the conclusion of the Fallon Report that 
what is needed is ‘a radical reappraisal of the foren-
sic psychiatric services and the Criminal Justice 
System’37. The transfer of prison care to the NHS 
ought to have represented a landmark in the secur-
ing of adequate treatment for the offender; but the 
result has not been satisfactory. In terms of fortify-
ing treatment rights for the offender with PD, it is 
hoped that both screening and the drive to increase 
research into the treatability of the condition will 
be infl uential in remedying the potential injustices 
of applying preventative detention to ostensibly 
therapeutic diversions from prison, under section 
47 of the MHA 1983.
Highlighting the poor position of current rights 
to treatment, however, ought not to be seen as 
external from the pressure on resources both 
in secure hospitals and in the penal system. 
Consequently, it may be that future litigation, 
coloured by Article 4 of the EPR 200638, is to be 
focused on Article 5 of the Convention. For, in the 
case of Aerts, one reason cited by the Government 
for its failure to implement the directed hospital 
care was overcrowding and constrained resources, 
yet a breach of Article 5(1)(e) was not prevented39. 
Should the decision in Aerts not improve treat-
ment rights for those in the penal system suffering 
from PD, a sympathetic voice concluding on the 
viability of treatment rights through human rights 
instruments would re-state principle 20(2) of the 
UN (1991) Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, namely, that the provision of 
treatment need only be ‘to the fullest extent 
possible’.
37At 7.1.3.
38The ECtHR ‘increasingly refers to both the existing Euro-
pean Prison Rules . . .’ (Van Zyl Smit, 2006). This impliedly 
points out the fact that an applicant seeking to rely on 
Article 4 would have already raised a viable human rights 
point before it became relevant.
39Furthermore, Article 3 of the ECHR is likely to become 
more infl uential in the future: see Dougoz v Greece (2001) 
ECHR 213; Peers v Greece (2001) ECHR 296; Kalashnikov 
v Russia (2002) ECHR 596. For discussion, see Snacken 
(2006).
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